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Days before the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, five US Army and Marine Corps officers introduced the concept of 'fourth-generation' warfare in an article published in the Marine Corps Gazette. Its basic outlines were as follows:
In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between 'civilian' and 'military' may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants' depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity (quoted in Jonathan Raban, 'The Truth about Terrorism', New York Review of Books, 52 (1), Jan 13,
2005).
The above quotation may point out that the roots of the dramatic change in American strategic ambitions were planted long before the presidency of George W. Bush Jr. and the opportunity taken by his advisors to launch a 'war on terror' after 9/11 (Golub, 2004) . It also shows the extent to which a shift towards states' involvements with nonstate actors cuts across diverse issues of political science. In the much-debated domain of globalisation studies, concerns about 'widely dispersed and largely undefined' phenomena, as well as claims about 'blurred distinctions' have contributed to the confusion. Attempts to clarify the economic and political transformations of contemporary capitalism have also led to a 'fourth generation' of scholarship -even though, on perspectivist grounds the debate relates more on contending approaches than successive generations (Cameron and Palan, 2003: 28) . Whilst particular prominence was first given to the rising power of global markets (Ohmae, 1990) , the emphasis quickly shifted onto the continuing role of the state in economic policy, if not at the national, then at the regional and international levels (Hirst and Thompson, 1996) . A third approach denies a priori assumptions about the relative importance of states and markets in the process of globalisation by considering their relationship as closely integrated (Germain, 1999; Gill, 1997; Held, et al., 1999; Mittelman, 1996) . As the role of nonstate actors across borders has become a matter of public debate as their influence has grown, a fourth strand of globalisation studies has sought to broaden the scope of enquiry to include new patterns and agents of change beyond states and firms (Bayart, 2004; Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000; Cutler, 2003; Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Hall and Biersteker, 2002; Haufler, 2001; Hibou, 1999; Higgott, et al., 1999; Ronit and Schneider, 2000; Sassen, 2006; Sassen, 2003; Strange, 1996) . This paper shares the assumption that the logic of action and the potential of change embodied by nonstate actors has become a core feature of new forms of authority in the global realm. By exploring what we call transnational private governance, it provides theoretical and empirical insights into the ability of nonstate actors to co-operate across borders in order to establish rules and standards of behaviour accepted as legitimate by agents not involved in their definition. Nonstate actors not only formulate norms, but often also have a key role in their enforcement. Accordingly, the current privatization of rule-making and enforcement goes much further than traditional lobbying in allowing private actors an active role in regulation itself. Domains concerned lie far beyond intergovernmental organizations, conventional non-governmental organizations, and multinational enterprises. In this respect, the book covers a wide range of situations, from highly formal systems of power devolution to lax and informal platforms of interaction between private actors.
Existing research on transnational private governance is in its infancy. A decade after the first set of studies that brought the topic to general attention, it is high time to review a process that is evolving extremely rapidly and provides us with sufficient empirical evidence to develop some theoretical propositions. We still lack comprehensive concepts ordering the different types of private governance. Similarly, we do not yet know under which conditions actors 'obey' norms that are not defined by states. There is also insufficient evidence of which sectors and which organizational formats are most likely to rely on transnational private governance. Finally, it is unclear how we could reconcile these forms of governance with established concepts of democratic legitimacy. This paper outlines a research agenda on transnational private governance that has been further explored in a recently published volume (Graz and Nölke, 2008) . It first presents two distinct scholarly traditions that in many respects stand as the most important contributions to our understanding of this phenomenon: on the one hand, approaches in comparative political economy (CPE) focus on institutional arrangements and coordinating logics of economic actors across nations; on the other, studies in global political economy (GPE) try to identify constitutive patterns of authority mediating between the political and the economic spheres of a transnational space. Although this distinction may be oversimplified, it may explain why GPE approaches give prime attention to channels of structural power across national economies, while CPE approaches examine how such transnational constraints require new forms of coordination among nations. Despite mutual indifference between them, we claim that important avenues of cross-fertilisation remain. We contend that three distinct issues are of particular relevance to overcome the divide between comparative and global political economy approaches on transnational private governance: providing conceptual clarification in order to define the social reality referred to as transnational private governance; identifying framework conditions that make transnational private governance possible; discussing normative implications that commonly raise many concerns. In our attempt to overcome the divide between CPE and GPE, we propose a framework of analysis, whose categories are delineated so as to offer a more systematic, yet flexible approach to understanding the conceptual, empirical, and normative aspects of transnational private governance.
The core contention of the paper is that transnational private governance is subject to important limits. While conventional analyses tend to highlight the newness and the innovative character of these forms of governance, we unambiguously question this view in emphasising limitations in three regards. The limits to transnational private governance refer first to the degree to which this phenomenon is really private, transnationalised and confined to governance per se. Second, the empirical framework conditions required for transnational private governance to be effective are circumscribed and can be for the most part systematically identified. Third, the normative shortcomings of transnational private governance clearly hinder its ability to embody procedural innovation in policy processes and to solve large socio-economic concerns.
The CPE debate: When do firms obey norms that are not set by states?
The point of departure for the CPE debate is the perception that governments alone cannot solve all problems of transnational economic regulation. This appears to be particularly true for the regulation of business, while the macro issues of trade and currencies still clearly fall into the realm of inter-governmental cooperation. While the public character of currency and trade issues forces a certain degree of intergovernmental cooperation, this element is absent from business regulation. Furthermore, following Stigler's (1971) early critique on the ability of business interest to capture the state in public regulation, the state command-and-control approach to regulation is considered too inflexible and too costly, therefore inclined to be substituted by the market-based incentives of voluntary business self-regulation (Blundell and Robinson, 1999) .
Cooperation between companies and civil society actors in the context of concepts such as 'corporate social responsibility', 'business ethics' and 'corporate citizenship' has attracted considerable attention. Much hope has been invested in the idea that capitalist externalities such as environmental degradation and the mistreatment of workers can be severely limited by standards developed and overseen by private institutions (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000) .
Examples for these standards comprise inter alia the ISO 14000 norm on environmental management (Clapp, 1998) , the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES) for environmentally responsible investments as well as the Forest Stewardship Council for sustainable forestry (both discussed in Pattberg 2004) or the human rightsoriented Social Accountability Standard 8000 (Braun 2001: 271) .
Given the voluntary character of these institutions, CPE scholarship aims at identifying the circumstances under which private actors obey norms that are not set by states. The following factors appear to be among the most influential conditions inferred from initial empirical studies:
• The degree of competition between the participating firms: The adherence to environmental or social norms can be a clear disadvantage in a very competitive environment. In contrast, the existence of a monopolistic or oligopolistic structure can help in facilitating private governance: 'Rules and standards that come from industry alone, without the participation of or enforcement by third parties, tend to be difficult to sustain due to competition among firms... other types of governance must supplement iteither by government regulation, or the dominance of a single private player' (Haufler, 2002: 10) .
• The type of company involved: Not all companies appear to be equally suited for a participation in the diverse forms of codes of conduct. Since the enforcement of private norms very much depends on consumers being able 'to respond to the signals being sent to reward those companies behaving well and punish those behaving badly' (Haufler 2002: 11) , big manufacturing companies with well-known brand names are particularly affected. Under certain circumstances, coordination service firms such as insurers or institutional investors can also attach importance to political, social or environmental issues as risks to be incorporated into contracts passed with key other (non-service) firms.
Thus, service firms can assume a coordinating role as standard-setters and third party enforcers, especially if they are in an oligopolistic position (Nölke, 2003a: 16) .
• The type of issue involved: The success of corporate initiatives may also widely differ as a result of the nature of the problem (Kollman 2003: 34f) . Improving social and labour practices obviously has implications for corporate and non-corporate actors than reducing environmental externalities; it often echoes core business concerns such as efficiency, competitiveness and technological innovation.
• The further development of post-materialist orientations: In a classic study on the declining significance of class voting, Inglehart (1977) found evidence of post-materialist orientations in the capacity of better-educated voters to make political decisions independent of class loyalty or other socio-economic attributes. Recent analyses make use of a similar argument in considering, for instance, that codes of conduct that rely on the support of labour unions have much less impact than those based on environmental or human rights movements (Kollman 2003: 34) . Given that most social groups promoting corporate social responsibility are themselves of middle class background with postmaterialist values, private governance also depends on the socio-economic environment of such groups. Thus, transnational private governance may be negatively affected by global economic crises (Rieth, 2004: 189) , but could also be supported by an expansion of the middle classes in the societies of the global South.
These issues indicate the broad range of pre-conditions that have to be met in order to make private norms an effective alternative to the conventional regulation of business. But even if these pre-conditions were met, we might still have second thoughts about such governance in view of its power effects and democratic deficit (e.g. Sundgren 1997 , Wolf 2002 . In the absence of the democratic institutions of the nation state, transnational private governance suffers from the fact that not all participating actors have equal power and some are not represented at all. This is particularly true for those of the wider public interest and from developing countries that are lacking the detailed knowledge that is necessary to participate meaningfully in private norm-setting and enforcement. Many hopes have been vested in the ability of NGOs to compensate for these weaknesses (Haufler 2002: 8-10) . NGOs can enhance legitimacy only on certain issues. Societal actors in transnational policy networks are variously represented within these networks (Nölke, 2003a, b) . Unions and consumer groups lack influence on the transnational level (while big multinational enterprises are being favoured) and within the 'NGO community mainstream Northern interests almost inevitably prevail.
In spite of these critical remarks, however, one can conclude that CPE studies usually are reasonable optimistic with private governance considered to be an important option for preventing the regulatory deficit created by the absence of (inter-) state regulation of transnational business. Even existing codes may have severe shortcomings in terms of effectiveness as well as democratic legitimacy, it is the role of the academic debate to highlight these shortcomings and contribute to the identification of alternative solutions. The CPE debate has identified some of the key mechanisms of how private governance works in practice and has developed some proposals for improving them. This pragmatic approach, however, has prevented CPE scholars from focusing on the wider economic and historical context of transnational private governance, including any broad perspective of the power structures involved.
The GPE debate: Transnational private governance within capitalist development
From a global political economy (GPE) perspective, most contributions to the CPE debate seem to be typical examples of problem-solving theories. Based on Robert Cox's (1981; 1987) famous dictum 'theory is always for someone and for some purpose' (emphasis in original), GPE scholars identify those studies as attempts to make the existing capitalist system work more smoothly. From a critical standpoint, GPE approaches are concerned with how the existing order came into being and, given the manifold exploitative features of capitalism, how to conceive its potential change. The focus is to place transnational private governance in the broader historical context of capitalist development. The line that separates public from private governance is not fixed and should be understood as contingent in time and space (Cutler, 1997) (Haufler 2002: 2-6 By setting these assumptions within the broader framework of capitalism, GPE scholars focus on structural forces and power relations, in particular the structural power of capital. A structural conception of power emphasizes the environment in which strategic interactions take place. The rise of private authority then points towards the development of the competition state, the deterritorialisation of capital and the related process of flexible accumulation (Cerny, 1990; Graz and Palan, 2004; Graz, 2006; Sassen, 2006; Sassen, 2003) . Besides the significance of transnational private governance for legitimising neoliberalism, GPE approaches also focus on forms often far removed from those examined in CPE studies. forceful critique of such authority. Yet, GPE scholars often neglect the concrete mechanisms of transnational private governance. Although some studies -particularly on merchant law (Cutler, 1997 (Cutler, , 2003 , rating agencies (Sinclair, 1999 (Sinclair, , 2005 , international capital adequacy frameworks (Chavagneux, 2001; King and Sinclair, 2003) , reporting standards (Soederberg, 2003) , or transnational elite clubs (Apeldoorn, 2002; Gill, 1990; Graz, 2003) go into much detail, they do not provide a middle range theory of transnational private governance in contemporary capitalism that could be generalised and probed on empirical grounds. These shortcomings relate by and large to the epistemological and theoretical underpinnings of global political economy approaches. First, there are obvious limitations in terms of complexity reduction for holistic historicist approaches focused on non causal explanations. As Gill points out, 'the idea is to transcend rigid theories of causality and move towards a more reflexive and dynamic form of political economy explanation […] , which insists upon the centrality of the interrelationship between the "subjective" and "objective" social forces in historical developments' (Gill, 1993a: 26-7) . Furthermore, critical arguments remain difficult to refute on empirical grounds. From a historical materialist perspective, developments contrary to an assumed rise of neoliberal capitalism reflect the dialectic of history. Polanyi (1983) called this a 'double movement', in that society inevitably seeks to protect itself from the market's drive to commodify increasing spheres of everyday life.
Finally, the broad transformative posture of GPE approaches are usually not matched by more concrete proposals on how to overcome the current deficits of transnational private governance.
Overcoming the divide between CPE and GPE
A review of the two most important current debates on transnational private governance shows that, although hardly flawless on their own ground, they might lead to substantial explanatory power if taken together. GPE accounts provide a much needed historical background in explanations highlighting power relations, but still fall short of outlining a theory of private governance which could be generalised, no do they present concrete proposals on how to use this mode of governance for a transformative agenda. CPE accounts, for their part, provide persuasive and concrete analyses of institutional mechanisms, completed by clearly identified practical proposals, but generally lack comprehensive explanatory power and normative discernment. Therefore, their picture of private governance remains descriptive and mostly inductive.
Yet, on conceptual grounds, both approaches focus on the transnational underpinning of contemporary politics in contrast to state-centred analyses. By highlighting the importance of private governance, both argue that the conventional state-centric accounts are unable to cover important forms of cross-border collective action. Similarly, on empirical grounds, both strands of analysis would have much to gain in searching to complement each other. While GPE scholarship has accumulated a wealth of knowledge about some of the critical capitalist infrastructures such as finance, law and technical standards, CPE enquiries have explored concrete attempts to tackle some of the worst effects of capitalism in the depletion of the environment and the mistreatment of workers' rights. Finally, in their normative orientation, CPE and GPE studies have more in common than often assumed, despite their different terminologies and difficulties in finding a common ground for dialogue. Both sides worry about the outcome of an unfettered capitalist expansion; both worry over the democratic legitimacy of transnational private governance; and both sides search for ways on how to overcome this sorry state of affairs. Further convergence would therefore not undermine their aspirations to transform -although probably on different planes -the current neoliberal capitalist model.
As can be inferred from the above discussion, three distinct issues are particularly relevant in 7overcoming the divide between comparative and global political economy approaches on transnational private governance. First, conceptual clarification is crucial to better define and circumscribe the social reality referred to as transnational private governance. Second, the explanation of the social action taking place within this distinct reality requires more detailed identification of the framework conditions that make transnational private governance possible. Third, as social action is inherently based on a set of shared or conflicting principles, the phenomenon of transnational private governance ultimately calls for a more elaborate account of its normative implications. Emphazising theses three issues will allow examination of transnational private governance from a comprehensive, yet differentiated perspective which embraces conceptual, analytical and normative levels of analysis (see Table 1 ).
Definition and concepts
The significance of the interrelationships between subjective and objective aspects of reality in social sciences makes the definition of concepts a crucial stage in understanding how existing order and potential historical change come about. As compared to experimental sciences, the object of any social science can never be treated as separate from the subject producing some knowledge about it. Inversely, the analyst cannot avoid the fact that he is part of the social world observed. His/her subjectivity reflects upon early assumptions, research questions, privileged theories, data set examined. As concepts are essential, yet never selfevident tools of social enquiry, clarity is all the more necessary in referring to transnational tenet of the book is that transnational private governance is something of an abuse of language as is it neither fully transnational, nor entirely private or excluding governments in its logic of action and power. This section explicates this contention on conceptual terms; the subsequent ones discuss how to probe the argument in analytical and normative terms.
Transnational
As Anderson (1991) and many others have pointed out, the assumed spatial correlation between the nation and the state has never existed, neither have distinct spaces separating discrete domestic national economies. The notion of transnational should therefore be situated beyond a mere inside/outside dichotomy. In this sense, it might be relevant to disaggregate further the notion between the functional and spatial scope involved in current reconfigurations of the political space.
First, the functional scope of the practices concerned cuts across the territorial basis of political institutions with a propensity to merge subnational, national, international, and supranational arenas. What is significant in the spatial implication of transnational governance is less the deterritorialisation of state sovereignty as such as that the deterritorialisation process brings to light a reorganisation of the logic at work in the production of space that encroaches upon the conflicting sources of authority on a transnational basis. As Saskia Sassen repeatedly emphasises in her comprehensive study on the 'denationalisation' of state agendas and the privatisation of norm-making, 'the rise of private authority is not simply an external force that constraints the state. It is partly endogenous to the state' (Sassen, 2006: 223 
Private
Many analyses have emphasised that governance refers to a new way to seek arrangements by systematically involving private actors, whether in the domestic or international arena (Murphy, 2000; Pierre and Peters, 2000) . Yet from a historical perspective, this is not so new.
The state, as we now know it, related to a given territory, controlling a closely defined population whose sovereignty is allegedly embodied in it, centralising monetary emission in conjunction with private agents -all this is a creation of the last third of the nineteenth century in the Western world. As Halliday points out, 'all that appears to be non-state is not so independent of the state, just as all that is new may not be as novel' (Halliday, 2001) . What is new with the involvement of private actors in transnational governance issues is not so much the extent and intensity of their influence as how some of them have managed to develop a new relationship with the polity. Two issues are at stake here: the range of private actors concerned and the support of the state.
As regards the first issue, a better understanding of the range of private actors involved in transnational governance practices undoubtedly depends on how we define the private/public distinction. While accounts may vary on how the development of capitalism, the modern state and civil society have shaped social relations along a separation between a private and a public sphere, scholarship in both global and comparative political economy has emphasised how both spheres should be analysed as closely related, reflecting two faces of the same coin.
For the purpose of the present analysis, the distinction can be understood as between a public sphere, which confers inclusive and universalistic rights of citizenship, and a private sphere, which brings into play such rights in order to provide exclusive and bounded contractual For instance, scholars with a background in neocorporatist studies would emphasise the 'shadow of hierarchy' required for effective self-regulation (see e.g. (Héritier, 2002) or Smismans in this volume), whilst transnational historical materialists would explain how private actors and the state should be understood as two different expressions of a larger configuration of social forces (see e.g. (Gill, 1993b) or (Holman, 2008) 
Governance
It is widely acknowledged that the notion of governance has gained currency since the 1970s in order to appraise various forms of political reorganisation at a distance from traditional governmental and intergovernmental decision-making. This is what the catchphrase 'governance without government' supposedly conveys. The notion of governance is also associated with the new institutional forms being explored with the demise of Fordism, where state was pivotal in securing a fair distribution of high productivity gains between capital and labour so as to ensure a relatively stable growth rate of the domestic economy. The concept of governance has thus achieved prominence both as a normative compass for change claimed to be closer to the people ('good governance') and an analytical tool to explore a supposed retreat of the state and the emergence of a new form of polity ('multilevel governance').
Speaking of governance thus requires specifying the type of power relations and the scope of regulatory practices concerned. Here again, two closely related issues are involved: on the one hand, the definition of the logic of power involved in governance impacts upon the scope of regulatory practices under investigation; on the other, the logic of action implemented according to distinct procedures within the framework of such power relations.
As far as the logic of power is concerned, most analytical accounts of governance rely on a definition focused on consensual arrangements, intentionally agreed upon by states and nonstate actors directly involved in setting and enforcing rules. Such an understanding replicates a relational view on power, which explores the ability of A to get B to do what he wants.
Analysing actual decision-making, its processes, procedures and potential biases from an actor-centred perspective, it mostly ignores, however, the structural underpinning of power relations, in which social forces can durably modify the environment of their practices in their own favour. As a number of contributors in this volume emphasise, governance should therefore be situated at the juncture of consensual and coercive power, involving intentional agreement as well as unintentional domination. Such an understanding of the notion of governance calls to mind Stephen Lukes' seminal conceptualisation of power, involving not only observable overt and covert conflicts, but also latent conflicts resulting from more deeper and structural contradictions in existing power relations (see (Lukes, 2005) and Fuchs in this volume). Just as Lukes' conceptualisation of power was inspired by the writings of Antonio
Gramsci on the state, the logic of power at stake in governance can be considered as closely related to the Gramscian concept of hegemony. Hegemony is understood as a form of social domination in which one group exercises leadership and imposes its projects through the explicit or tacit consent of all those drawn into the coalition of social forces identifying their particular interest as the general interest. Recognizing the logic of power in governance issues as an ongoing combination of consensus and coercion, reflecting intentional and unintentional domination alike, leads us to enlarge the scope of regulatory practices concerned. Governance in this respect encompasses both the narrow sense of regulation, deregulation or re-regulation on specific issue areas and the institutional framework embedding such rules, and the larger sense of self-reproducing unintentional domination through which a structure of thought and action can be so internalised that they appear as natural and inevitable.
Within the framework of such power relations, our second point relates to the logic of action implemented according to distinct procedures. Specifying the logic of action is all the more important in governance studies as they often regard the type of procedures involved as the most important feature of this new way of organizing our societies. A shared assumption in the literature is that informal and non-hierarchical forms of governance are increasingly replacing command-and-control hierarchical and formal types of state regulation. Nonhierarchical 'steering modes' based on private-public partnerships are, for instance, a central feature in the debate on the legitimacy of this type of governance (Risse, 2006) . In a different vein, the World Economic Forum can be viewed as a critical case of the potential authority exercised on a global scale by informal and weakly institutionalized non-state actors such as transnational élite clubs. Yet, even in such a case, there are intrinsic limits in loosely informal arrangements divorced from the legitimate institutions of public life (Graz, 2003) . Similarly, non-hierarchical procedures such as those analysed by principal agent approaches or those implemented in private -public partnerships often need the 'shadow of hierarchy' to be effective. It makes little sense to view the logic of action underpinning governance as distinctively informal and non-hierarchical. Governance more accurately sets in motion a logic of action inventing new channels in the relations between formal and informal procedures, as well as hierarchical and non-hierarchical mechanisms of social action.
Framework conditions
Whilst the preceding discussion should contribute to better conceptualize transnational private governance, we still should explain in more details the framework conditions that make transnational private governance possible. The core task here is to identify the circumstances under which private actors obey norms that are not initiated or set by states. Our goal is to explore the significance of a number of empirical scope conditions that appear to be essential for initiating, implementing, and sustaining transnational private governance. While there is an extensive literature on the various aspects related to governance as a new mode of policy processes and power relations, especially in the context of the European integration (Héritier, 2002; Majone, 1996) , very few attempts so far exist in reviewing on a systematic basis its both private and transnational underpinnings.
Approaches in terms of international private authority initiated the agenda by stressing that at least three conditions should be met for such new forms of governance to be effective: an explicit or implicit recognition by the state; the consent of actors subject to the rules without having been involved in their making; a high degree of compliance to the rules so as to be able to clearly differentiate between private power or influence in general, and the more specific category of private governance (Cutler, et al., 1999: 19 ). Yet, despite the development of a typology of private authority along six types of cooperative arrangements from loosely informal industry norms and practices to formal private regimes governing rules in a distinct issue area, the analysis remains unclear on the compliance issue, which precisely determines whether we are to refer to this particular phenomenon. Moreover, as the analysis focuses exclusively on cooperative arrangements between firms, it remains unclear how it could be extended to arrangements including other types of non-state actors. In their attempt to broaden the understanding of private authority in international affairs, Hall and Bierstecker (2002) considerably extend the types of actors potentially concerned by including not-forprofit bodies and illicit organizations. In doing so, they distinguish between "market authority" exercised through co-operative arrangements among firms, "moral authority" expected from nongovernmental organisations or religious movements, and "illicit authority" exercised by organised crime or mercenaries. While this approach is successful in exploring the authoritative dimensions of private nonstate actors other than firms in the contemporary system, the typology is misleading. Moral claims underpin market authorities, banking for instance on corporate social responsibility, just as growth and monetary concerns pervade moral authorities claimed by NGOs and new social movements. Moreover, the notion of illicit authority tends to confound authority and power, neglecting that only the former can claim to a power recognised as legitimate. As Hall and Bierstecker themselves note, 'authority thus requires both recognition by, and the consent of, those governed by that authority' (ibid: 204).
Illicit practices can indeed be consensual as part of a resistance movement aiming for a radical change in society and manoeuvring in the covert world; yet illicit activities also often involve extortion, brute force, and the rule of fear that can hardly qualify as consent. The following analytical framework tries to overcome these shortcomings in order to reach a more comprehensive, yet differentiated understanding of the core conditions into play in initiating, implementing and sustaining transnational private governance. The framework reflects an approach which presumes a profound interrelationship between ideal and material conditions, as well as structural and more actor-centered forms of explanations.
Structural conditions
The broadest structural feature defining the empirical scope of transnational private governance relates to a distinct social system of production. As discussed above with regard to the emergence of the notion of governance itself, transnational private governance should be situated in a particular phase of development of modern capitalism. Various accounts have provided insightful analyses of how a new social system of production, sometimes called post-Fordism, has undermined the role priorly detained by the state in the distribution of productivity gains between capital and labour on a national basis (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997) . Such a restructuring of the economic and political spheres across borders is also known as neoliberalism. No single criteria could on its own sum up what neoliberalism is. It nonetheless reflects the intellectual climate, the material reality and political project behind a form of globalisation, which sets individual freedom and ownership as supreme rights by reinforcing the domination of capital over labour, especially the power of finance, throughout a world economy expected to be free from state-imposed restrictions. As Murphy (2002) points out, 'the social forces that have continued to back the neoliberal agenda are truly transnational, which implies that to understand contemporary global governance we need to develop a class analysis that transcend national boundaries'. At the same time, it appears that the social system of production underpinning transnational private governance is prone to involve stakeholders more broadly defined than in traditional class-based tripartism between labour, capital and the state. The wide range of diverse actors involved in the proliferation of codes of conduct is for instance significant of this shift away from the central role of the state in the Fordist era.
Distinct forms of competition also enhance the rise of transnational private governance. While CPE and GPE approaches may be familiar with the argument, they often lack detailed analysis of the issues at stake. Various studies have none the less analysed how transformations in the organization of markets can reinforce the ability of private actors to play a more direct role in rule setting and enforcement. From a regulation theory perspective, Petit and others contends that changes in forms of competition on an international basis are even so significant that they now tend to play the central role that the wage-labour nexus used to play in the domestic arena under Fordism (Coriat, et al., 2006; Dannreuther and Petit, 2006; Petit, 1999) . Drawing upon economic sociology and business studies on alliance capitalism (Dunning, 1997) , Portnoy (1999) also argues that strategic alliances among MNCs not only reshape the competitive environment by expanding industrial networks beyond national borders in establishing so-called 'transnational industrial orders', but also promote new forms of political management in which internationally organised industries are heavily involved.
As mentioned above, the type of company matters, with big manufacturing companies with well-known brand names expected to be more involved in transnational private governance than others. Besides the degree and the type of competition, as well as the type and size of firms involved, a market organised along global value chains supposing an extreme disaggregation of the production process and its relations to the consumer requires heavy coordination mechanisms. In this respect, forms of competition also relate to the coherence provided by coordination service firms. Hence, in order to understand which form of competition is most likely to enhance transnational private governance we should look not only at the structure of the market, but also the size and types of firms involved. The chapters that follow will fully illustrate that, contrary to what is often assumed, regulatory innovation in transnational private governance is far from echoing highly competitive markets. Rather it takes place in an oligopolistic environment, characterised by limited competition and dominated by big firms active in coordination services and highly dependant on global value chains International institutional embeddedness. The distinct role that institutional constraints can play on political economy issues has now been extensively explored in historical institutionalist approaches on varieties of capitalism, with strong national trajectories and regulatory sequences between the domestic and international spheres (Hall and Soskice, 2001 ). In contrast to domestic forms of governance analysed from an international basis, such means of creating order and setting rules are conventionally considered as weakly institutionalized when projected on a transnational spectrum -apart from some specialized issues areas. This assumption is unmistakably reinforced when private forms of governance are involved. An extreme illustration of this view is to identify the EU governance system as a 'multi-level, non-hierarchical, deliberative and apolitical governance, via a complex web of public/private networks and quasi autonomous executive agencies' (Hix, 1998: 54) . Yet, just as many studies have highlighted that the EU governance systems is backed up by a large set of institutional constraints, the question is not so much whether transnational private governance is embedded in international institutions, but rather in which institutions, at which level, granted with kind of enforcement power and authority. In this respect, a core task in analysing transnational private governance is to identify in more detail the degree along which it is institutionally embedded on an international plane. As the chapters put together in Graz and Nölke (2008) show in detail, the picture is indeed quite different according to whether we are looking at transnational private governance within the ambit of the EU governance system of Internet domain names or accounting standards for listed companies, or at the UN framework on food labelling or workers rights, not to mention global banking regulation and supervision under the umbrella of the Bank for International Settlements.
Policy types. An aspect which lies at the juncture of structural conditions and explanations focused on the action of those involved in transnational private governance is the type of policy concerned. The effect that the specific problem at hand may have on the ability of policy networks to influence domestic politics was pointed out a long time ago (Lowi, 1972) .
In this perspective, redistributive policies are far less likely to be dealt with by these networks because of their high degree of politisation. In the same vein, scholarship on transnational policy assumes that economic policies perceived as redistributive lead to intergovernmental rather than transgovernmental relations. Social groups that feel disadvantaged would mobilize against these policies and therefore shift decision-making from the technical and bureaucratic transgovernmental to the more political intergovernmental level (Keohane and Nye, 1974: 129; Risse-Kappen, 1995: 8) . Conversely, regulatory policies would be more conducive to transnational governance as they are considered to incur heavy resource dependency between actors who regulate and are regulated -the former needing, for instance, information from the latter; and the latter formal recognition from the former in order to pursue their interests. This scholarship, however, remains focused on public policies and public agencies. An important avenue of reasoning then is to explore how distinct policy types are decisive in the privatisation of transnational governance. While transnational private governance is more likely to occur with regulatory than redistributive policies, the distinction is to some extent misleading as redistributive concerns can never be totally kept out of regulatory issues.
Different types of regulatory issues may also affect with great variance the ability of transnational private governance to become effective {Graz, 2008 #1164}.
Actor-based conditions
Besides the four groups of factors identified above according to the degree of structural constraints exercised on the rise of transnational private governance, at least two additional, more actor-based characteristics should be included among the sets of pre-conditions to be met in order to make transnational private governance an effective alternative to the more conventional regulation of capitalism across borders. The first relates to the distinct set of resources at hand; the second to the homogeneous values among the agents directly involved in the process.
Resources mobilised by agents into a specific logic of action are a central issue in analyzing policy processes. Financial capabilities, the use of force, loyalty, information, prestige and the like all belong to various explanations aimed at identifying a distinct set of resources reinforcing the ability of actors to define outcomes in particular issue areas. In contrast to conventional approaches in international relations, resource dependency theories on transnational policy networks give considerable space to the activity of private actors, yet they stop short of private self-regulation mechanisms and do not specifically address political economy issues (Nölke, 1995 (Nölke, , 2000 . In the same vein, sociological approaches on resource dependencies in inter-organisational networks help to analyse the exchange of material and immaterial resources between mutually and often asymmetrically dependent organizations, especially large firms. As the outcome of resource exchanges usually transcends the corporate actors on which those approaches concentrate, it may as well correspond to a precondition for the development of transnational private governance. Typical resources exchanged in policy networks include finance, information and legitimacy. In contrast to the domestic policy process, transnational private governance would therefore more likely be driven by resources predominantly available by private actors, involving consensual rather than coercive action, and implementing a functional scope across borders. While this assumption is closely related to conventional accounts of the inability of the state to undertake the complex tasks involved in governance and its reliance on the expertise of private actors and the knowledge of professional organizations to deal satisfactorily with such policies, for private actors, building a consensus on complex issues across borders also depends upon resources others than knowledge and expertise, including reputation or credibility among the immaterial resources, financial capabilities and leverage power in the domain of material resources. contributors to that volume borrow to the world society perspective and the Bourdieusian field approach to pay special attention to the processes of scientisation, marketisation, formal organizing, moral rationalization, and reinvented democratisation. Ultimately, the argument that a high degree of homogeneity of values is likely to be a precondition in transnational private governance takes us back to the sociology of elites (Scott, 1990) . Classical studies by Pareto, Mosca, Michels or Mills considered that the power of a 'governing elite', a 'political class', an 'oligarchy, or a 'power élite' depended upon a distinct organisational feature, in particular the shared consciousness of being a group with distinct interests, institutional positions enabling the achievement of such interests, and a capacity for coordination facilitating greater unity of action through planning. This so-called "Machiavellian" tradition of elite analysis emphasizes the concept of control over the means of production in contrast to ownership in the orthodox Marxian class analysis, just as transnational cadre analyses rely on a comprehensive concept to understand the key role they play in present times (Pijl, 2004) .
Unmistakably, a broad range of pre-conditions must be met in one way or another in order to make transnational private governance an effective alternative to the conventional regulation of business. Even if these preconditions were met, we might still have second thoughts about this type of governance which raises important normative concerns. This is what we want to examine in the following section.
Normative implications
Transnational private governance not only requires conceptual clarification and a detailed analytical framework, but also an examination of its normative implications to better understand the current shift in the organization of the political economy of contemporary capitalism. The notion is indeed often used to support the participation of new actors in the policy process, assuming that they would better tackle complex sectoral issues. If left to market self-regulation or plain state regulation, the argument goes, the stakes would remain unstable at best, if not unable to deliver social justice. In this respect, transnational private governance is identified as a procedural innovation in policy processes suited to solve distinct socio-economic concerns on a cross-border basis. The conditions under which such a claim can be sustained have gained the utmost importance in the governance debate. Yet, unsurprisingly, scholars remain deeply divided in their conclusions. For instance, Haufler (Haufler, 2001: 4) states: 'Voluntary standard setting by firms is a logical response to the ambiguities and uncertainties of the current global system. It responds to societal pressure, while avoiding rigid government interference. It is voluntary and therefore can be applied in a flexible manner. It is potentially global in scope, and if adopted widely, would reduce costs, increase efficiency, and prevent other corporations from gaining competitive advantage'. In contrast, Picciotto (2000: 162) reminds us that 'the growth of international regulatory or governance networks does not constitute the reduction of the scope of international politics, but rather its pursuits by other means. Certainly, it may entail an attempt to "depoliticize" issues, by deploying scientific, managerial, or professional techniques and basing their solution on universalizing discourses'. In order to shed light on such conflicting arguments, the following discussion attempts to explain the normative implications of transnational private governance in conjunction to two interrelated issues: the substantial socio-economic concerns on the one hand, and procedural innovation in the polity on the other.
Socio-economic concerns
The issue on which the CPE and GPE approaches outlined above most profoundly disagree is the normative assessment of the socio-economic consequences of transnational private governance. While CPE scholars usually praise the problem-solving outcome of transnational private governance in distinct areas, GPE approaches lay emphasis on how it contributes to stabilising a neoliberal socio-economic order considered as inherently unjust. The detailed empirical studies brought together in this volume should help to probe in some respects the persuasiveness of each perspective. Whilst different research agendas can benefit from each other's analytical insights and empirical evidence, distinct ontological, epistemological and theoretical underpinnings will of course remain. As Cox reminds us, problem-solving approaches are 'useful for correcting dysfunctions and maintaining order in the whole. [Yet,] a different kind of knowledge is required in order to understand how historical change has come about and how change can be brought' (Cox, 2002:xii) . We should thus first clarify the more specific claims of each perspective.
Problem solving capacity. For researchers working on the environment, labor standards or human rights, transnational private governance is frequently seen as the most realistic option to improve the state of affairs in non OECD countries. Given the unwillingness of governments and the inability of intergovernmental organisations to provide satisfactory responses, private governance based on corporate social responsibility schemes is thought to be a pragmatic remedy for some of the most pressing concerns (Haufler, 2001) . In a slightly different perspective, transnational private governance is also perceived as an important contribution for the provision of problem-solving mechanisms in situations where governments or intergovernmental organisations are seen as too inflexible to provide for effective regulation. This is particularly true for fast-moving sectors such as in ICT (Salter, 1999) or finance (Sinclair, 2005 ). Yet, more often than not, these regulatory practices remain ambivalent. A core question ,then, is whether transnational private governance is really able to solve large societal problems such as environmental degradation, human rights or systemic risks in finance.
Institutionalisation or transformation of neoliberalism. Even if transnational private
governance could be considered as successful according to the criteria outlined above, there is still a larger problem, namely its potentially stabilising role for the current order of neoliberal capitalism. The focus of the critique here explicitly targets the reasons for which transnational private governance would be praised as an efficient problem-solving policy, i.e. the substitution of private regulation for public national or inter-governmental policy. Against this background, transnational private governance reflects an attempt to permanently fix the current weak role of public international regulation of business, in the same vein as other forms of contemporary global governance (Bayart, 2004; Gill, 1998; Overbeek, 2004; Picciotto, 2000) . Having transnational private governance in place legitimises the retreat of the state or at least its unwillingness to tackle certain issues by intergovernmental regulation.
This, in turn, works as a shield against popular calls for business re-regulation in case of major discontent with economic globalisation. Thus, private governance is supposed to make it more difficult for labor unions and social movements to mobilise, whereas business' preference for the existing socio-economic order is being privileged. Correspondingly, empirical studies suggest that private governance often prevents public regulation and that the substance of regulation is particularly in line with the preferences of business {Graz, 2008 #1164}.
Procedural issues
Both the scholarly and public debate are concerned by the lack of democratic legitimacy of transnational private governance. Governance is usually not primarily conceived for its ability to democratise policy-making, but rather as a solution to functional problems on specific issues requiring collective action. Yet, as legal scholars would put it, the new phenomenon of transnational governance must not make us forget our old questions, such as who bears the responsibility for governance without a government (Joerges, et al., 2004) Democratic legitimacy. If political capture is defined more broadly than effects on outcomes, the infringement of transnational private governance on sovereign rights of citizens more structurally refers to a private control on resources and to the capacity of private actors to durably modify the environment of their practices in their own favour. For example, in the domain of technical specifications, consumers or labour representatives are at pains to compete with business interests regarding the time, money and expert knowledge required to fully take part at the global level in the procedures defined for setting and assessing technical standards such as those of the ISO. In many ways, the delegation of sovereign citizens' rights to non elected bodies corresponds to a reinvention of corporatism: private interest groups and other private organisations are gaining public status and direct access to the political system in order to supposedly secure a stronger consensus. As many critics have argued, the theory of corporatism fails to capture the full nature of the framework of power in which these practices take place. As Ottaway (2001: 266) points out, 'it is doubtful that close cooperation between essentially unrepresentative organizations [...] will do much to ensure better protection for, and better representation of, the interests of populations affected by global politics'. Although institutional arrangements -such as the Global Compact on corporate responsibility, or the newly assigned role to IASC-IASB in accounting standards -can be understood as providing innovative solutions for new problems, they also encompass a more defensive aspect by neutralizing potential critique through cooptation of its most moderate elements. Inclusion and exclusion appear as two faces of the same coin. As Hermet emphasises, governance may thus well reflect the 'most recent reconfiguration of the imprescriptible aporia of real democracy, one that will always shy away from the sovereign rights of actors excluded from the cooptation at the top' (Hermet, 2005: 21) . Whilst such a delegation of sovereign rights may have certain advantages in terms of output legitimacy, it also alters the character of governance by raising problems of accountability and input legitimacy.
Conclusions: The limits of transnational private governance
The central tenet of this paper is that transnational private governance in the contemporary world faces tough limits across three issues. There are limits on definition of each term of the concept. There are limits on framework conditions, as transnational private governance does not work in a number of situations. There are normative limitations, on the ability to solve economic, social, and ecological problems of global capitalism as well as deep reservations regarding the lack of democratic legitimacy. Devoting greater attention to such limitations appear to be particularly significant against the backdrop of a literature that tends to portrait transnational private governance as a major break-though towards more effective global governance. Against this background, this paper should contribute to a research agenda that draws attention to transnational private governance from a more critical perspective. Far from closing the book on the topic, it may thus broaden the field of future research and reinforce its analytical coherence, particularly on conceptual issues, theoretical implications, empirical coverage, and institutional design.
As far as future conceptual understanding is concerned, we hope that we were clear enough in
showing that transnational private governance is not so transnational, not so private, and not so close to the ideal of 'governance' as described by many observers. Whilst this may leave us in need of a better-suited term for identifying on conceptual grounds future empirical research, further desegregation may also be required to generate new hypotheses and typologies on various forms of transnational private governance. Regarding theoretical implications, this paper tries to bring together the comparative and global traditions of political economy to make inroads in explaining the emergence and potential developments of transnational private governance, including the identification of framework conditions for the advent of such forms of governance. Future research will hopefully probe and engage the analytical framework we put together in order to distinguish between conceptual, theoretical and normative issues. Similarly, the empirical coverage of this paper is large enough to generate findings upon which drawing lessons at a high level of generalisation. It is not comprehensive though. Our understanding of transnational private governance should in particular pay more importance to the fast growing developments currently underway in the service sector. As services have assumed a crucial importance in our society and are increasingly internationalised, they also rely more on a mix of public-private standards and coordination practices as a result of regulatory reforms (Graz et al. 2007; Kessler 2007; Nölke 2007) . Further research may thus focus on transnational private governance in domains such as consultancy, standardization of consumer and social services (quality support, transportation, tourism, healthcare, higher education (see e.g. Hartmann (forthcoming))), as well as on private military companies increasingly entwined in the security agenda (Leander 2007 ).
Finally, this paper was not thought out as a direct contribution to institutional design.
Nevertheless, important lessons could be drawn for engaging the concrete world in which transnational private governance is institutionally embedded. By providing an explicit discussion of its normative implications, it sets out the debate on how some forms of transnational private governance are likely to raise more concerns than others according to distinct criteria for organising and changing contemporary societies. 
